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Abstract: In this article, we discuss the relation between the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) and its jurisprudence and social mobilizations around the
place of religion in the society. We focus on the struggles to define the intersection
of religion and public education in Romania after the fall of communism. We
show that secularist and counter-secularist civil society activists contending for the
place of religion in public education in this country have made strategic use of the
ECtHR and its case law, both in legal battles and in debates within the national
public sphere. We argue that, since references to the ECtHR and its jurisprudence
can be used in discursive battles as a form of symbolic “capital”, the strategies of
mobilizing actors are at times more important than the strict doctrinal content of
the ECtHR’s judgments for understanding if and how the ECtHR’s “shadow” is
cast over religion-related mobilizations.
INTRODUCTION
We engage here an object of intense academic scrutiny: the European
Court of Human Rights (hereafter “ECtHR”, “the European Court”, or
simply “the Court”), arguably the world’s most influential human rights
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tribunal (Durham and Kirkham 2016). We share past analyses’ preoccupa-
tion with the Court’s religion-related jurisprudence, mainly characterized
until now as having a secularizing influence (e.g., Evans and Petkoff
2008, Gu¨lalp 2010, Koenig 2015, Ringelheim 2017; compare Mancini
2009). This already developed body of literature focuses on the doctrinal
substance of the Court’s judgments and their potential “direct” judicial
and administrative impact. In contrast, our analysis aims to contribute to
the study of the broader, comparatively less examined, “indirect” effects
of the Court’s jurisprudence (Fokas 2015). We show that the Court’s juris-
prudence plays a part in religion-related mobilizations in post-communist
Romania. Here, normative statements from the Court’s judgments are
called upon both by those seeking a reduced role for religion in the
society and policy-making, as well as by those defending a prominent
role. The Court’s “shadow” expands beyond the legal arena, especially
when both secularist and counter-secularist activists engage the language
of “rights” to argue their claims in the public sphere. We argue that, in
order to understand how (and to what effect) the Court’s “shadow” is
cast over social mobilizations around religion’s place in the society, we
need to look beyond the doctrinal substance of the Court’s decisions to
the uses that social actors make of them in (counter-)secularist conflicts
carried out both within and beyond the legal arena.
Our inquiry started from the following main questions: “who are the
social actors who pay attention to the Court’s religion-related decisions”,
and “how are these actors’ religion-related mobilizations connected to the
decisions’ content?” In other words, for whom and in which ways does the
Court become relevant for social mobilization around the place of religion
in the society?2
Issues concerning the “religion-and-education” nexus—we focus here
on religious education classes, religious symbols in public schools, and
sex education—have been central topics of contention in the redefinition
of religion-state relations in Romania after 1990. They are at the core of
this analysis because they serve perfectly to illustrate both the develop-
ment of national-level secularist and counter-secularist activism and the
appeal to the Court therein. While our analysis focuses on the religion-
and-education issues, we occasionally look also beyond this arena of con-
tention, at other topics that have stoked (counter-)secularist mobilizations
referencing the Court and its case law (such as the issue of the legal pro-
tection of same-sex couples). In addition, we describe not only the
national-level dynamics of contention, but also some of the transnational
dynamics that have influenced the former. We show that the civil society
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activists have played crucial roles in shaping the Court’s relevance for reli-
gion-related mobilizations by linking national and transnational mobiliza-
tion dynamics and by shifting between distinct social fields, especially
between the legal arena and the public sphere.
In the second section below, we introduce our theoretical perspective and
present our methodology. In the third section, we provide a historical over-
view ofmobilizations around religion-and-education issues, and bring to the
fore the most prominent actors involved therein. In the fourth and fifth sec-
tions we point to how actors involved in religion-related mobilizations
developed and maintained an interest in the European Court’s decisions.
In the concluding section, we emphasize that, in order to understand the rel-
evance of the Court for religion-related mobilizations, we need to pay atten-
tion to the strategic uses that activists make of the Court’s jurisprudence.
(COUNTER-)SECULARIZATION IN THE “SHADOW” OF THE
COURT: ACTORS, STAKES, AND THE COURT’S PLACE IN THE
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE
Romania provides a particularly fruitful context for studying the relation
between the Court’s jurisprudence and (counter-)secularist mobilizations.
First, the country has been the site of a dynamic resurgence of religious
influence on state policy after the fall of communism in 1989. In its
attempts to assert itself as the “national church” (Romocea 2011), the
majority Romanian Orthodox Church (hereafter simply “Orthodox
Church”) catalyzed limitations on the religious freedom of minority com-
munities through the intervention of state authorities (some of which also
triggered complaints at the Court; see Popa and Andreescu 2017 for an
updated overview). The Orthodox Church’s role is also prominent in the
counter-secularist mobilizations we analyze here. Second, while it was
witnessing the reinvigoration of institutionalized religion after commu-
nism, Romania was undergoing the complex political, economic, and
social process of integration into the European Union (EU, joined in
2007), preceded by the developments that resulted in the Council of
Europe membership ( joined in 1994). While these processes are them-
selves relevant for (de-)secularization dynamics (on EU membership
see, e.g., Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006), we mention them here particu-
larly for their significance regarding the Court’s influence.
It was especially during the process of EU integration that the
Romanian post-communist state was hard pressed to comply with the
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European human rights standards (a component of the EU acquis commu-
nautaire). This element distinguishes Romania’s relation to the Court (via
EU mechanisms) from that of countries like Italy (a founding member of
the EU) or Turkey (currently trapped in a stalemate with respect to EU
accession negotiations). Until present (writing in December 2017), the
Court has become a visible and legitimate component of the “political
opportunity structure” (Koopmans 1999) relevant for citizen–state interac-
tion in Romania. To this fact attest both the high number of cases from
Romania pending in Strasbourg (with a correspondingly high track
record of violations)3 and recent survey data on Romanians’ perceptions
of the Court.4 The Council of Europe’s Court scores close in public
levels of perceived trustworthiness to the institutions of the EU,5 with
which it is at times symbolically conflated (as “European” institutions).
As our analysis indicates, these public perceptions find correspondence
in the present-day referencing of the Court and its case law not only in
court rooms, but also in debates in the national public sphere.
To start zooming in on the subject of our inquiry, in the following sub-
section, we link conceptually the Court’s place in the political opportunity
structure for citizen action with its relevance for (counter-)secularist
mobilizations in Romania; we then present our data gathering methodology.
Theoretical Framework
Socio-legal scholars have pointed out that the courts of law produce
effects not only through their rulings in particular cases, but also
through the meanings that these rulings acquire in the society more gen-
erally (Galanter 1983; McCann 2004). Drawing on this insight, it is
important to distinguish between the strictly administrative (“direct”)
effects of court rulings and their broadly social effects (“indirect”, or
“radiating”, to use Marc Galanter’s term). For the purpose of analyzing
how social actors use court rulings to bring changes in the society and
state policy, we find it useful to think of these rulings’ effects as taking
place across social “fields” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Fligstein and
McAdam 2011). The legal arena and the public sphere are the two
fields (see, e.g., Bourdieu 1977, Fraser 1990, Calhoun 2010) central to
our analysis.
Madsen (2007) and more recently Koenig (2015) have made the case
for regarding the European Court as an institution embedded in a “trans-
national legal field”. Both authors emphasized that, in time, the Court has
taken a more independent stance in relation to the interests of the Council
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of Europe member states in interpreting the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). This has led, in Koenig’s (2015) view, to the
Court becoming an “agent of secularization” (57) in Europe, among
others by providing “authoritative repertoires of justification” (72) for
those contesting states’ privileging of religious majorities. In his analysis,
Koenig refers to a variety of religion-related cases, including Dahlab v.
Switzerland (2001), Refah Partisi v. Turkey (2003), Șahin v. Turkey
(2005), Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey (2007), and Lautsi v. Italy
(2011) (see the brief descriptions of these and additional cases relevant
for our analysis in Table 2 of the Appendix6). Expanding on Koenig’s
(2015) remarks, we view recent Court jurisprudence concerning the
legal protection of same-sex couples (e.g., Oliari and Others v. Italy
[2015]) as similarly providing repertoires of justification for those pressing
for a lesser influence of religious views on family law and policy.
If the Court offers chances of litigation success to the “secularists”, it
becomes relevant also for the corresponding opposing movement (Meyer
and Staggenborg 1996). It counts as a source of “opportunities”—
understood as both “possibilities” and “threats” (Koopmans 1999, 96)—
that can influence the mobilization of both secularist and counter-secularist
activists. We draw on these insights in our analysis, additionally looking
beyond the confines of the juridical field for possible uses of the Court’s
jurisprudence.
Our emphasis on how social actors use the Court’s jurisprudence in an
arena of religion-related conflict brings us close to the recent analyses of
(counter-)secularization processes. With Smith (2003) and Karpov (2010),
among others, we consider that “secularization” is most fruitfully analyzed
from the viewpoint of the processes of social conflict that oppose actors
with different interests concerning the place of religion in the society
(rather than as the agent-less corollary of processes of modernization).
Like these authors, we emphasize actors’ strategies and the resources
they draw on, including the symbolic resources (such as knowledge of
the Court’s case law) deployed in debates in the national public sphere.
Conceptualized by Ju¨rgen Habermas as a neutral space for reasoned
dialogue mediating between state action and citizen will (Habermas
[1962] 1991), the “public sphere” has recently been approached from ana-
lytical perspectives that emphasize inequality and domination (e.g., Fraser
1990, Calhoun 2010). Fraser (1990), for instance, has insisted that actors
endowed with different levels of power struggle to define legitimate dis-
courses within the national public sphere. Thus, discursive practices are
not simply neutral, rational, and oriented toward the common good (as
Religion and Education in Romania S83
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048318000068
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Max-Planck-Institutes, on 30 Mar 2020 at 07:52:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
in the original Habermasian normative formulation), but practices of social
“distinction” expressing and reinforcing, rather than suspending, status
inequalities (Fraser 1990, 60). Also emphasizing conflict and inequality,
Calhoun (2010) more recently suggested to look at the public sphere
itself as a “field” in Bourdieu’s sense, and to take into account the inequal-
ities that influence its dynamics, including the distribution of different
forms of “capital” among participants.
It is precisely as a “species of capital” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 98)
that we can best conceive of the knowledge of the Court’s case law among
the actors involved in the (counter-)secularist mobilizations analyzed here.
As Bourdieu pointed out,
the value of a species of capital (e.g., knowledge of Greek or of integral cal-
culus) hinges on the existence of a game, of a field in which this compe-
tency can be employed: a species of capital is what is efficacious in a
given field, both as a weapon and as a stake of struggle, that which
allows its possessors to wield a power, an influence, and thus to exist, in
the field under consideration, instead of being considered a negligible quan-
tity (1992, 98, emphasis in the original).
Knowledge of the Court’s case law, like knowledge of Greek in the
quotation above, is relevant in present-day Romania in the juridical
field. Judges and prosecutors are both regularly trained in the Court’s
case law and formally evaluated according to the extent to which their
decisions make reference to the ECtHR. Knowledge of the Court’s juris-
prudence functions as a marker of distinction for lawyers as well, espe-
cially in a context in which appropriating this knowledge depends much
more on individual skill (knowledge of English and French, the Court’s
official languages) and professional experience than on formal training.7
In addition, knowledge of the Court’s case law is also relevant in the
public sphere, where various actors ( jurists and non-jurists alike) invoke
the ECtHR as a source of ultimate justice or of authoritative pronounce-
ments regarding respect for human rights. As we show below, both secu-
larist and counter-secularist activists learn about the Court, pay attention to
its case law, and invoke it in both legal proceedings and in public debates.
This theoretical perspective allows us to “de-center” (Galanter 1983) the
analysis of the Court’s “shadow” over religion-related mobilizations,
and to observe that the actors’ discursive strategies are at times more
important than the strict doctrinal content of the Court’s judgments for
understanding if and how the latter are referenced.
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Methodology
The empirical material on which this analysis draws stems mainly from the
first author’s field research carried out between April 2015 and June 2017.
The research was carried out within the framework of the ERC-funded
program “Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Examining
Grassroots Mobilisations in the Shadow of European Court of Human
Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence” (Grassrootsmobilise) and
involved a multi-method approach, which included: (1) textual analysis
of materials from online mass media sources, as well as from administra-
tive texts and court case files; (2) interviews with individuals selected for
the project’s different religion-related research themes (e.g., the legal
status—religious freedom nexus, analyzed in Popa and Andreescu
2017); (3) observation of discursive practices in public events. The
main aim of the larger field research was to take note of social actors’
awareness of the Court and their use of references to the Court and its
case law in religion-related mobilizations.
Apart from textual sources and observation notes, the analysis presented
in this article draws on a subsample of Grassrootsmobilise interviews (see
Table 1 in the Appendix). In the wider research project, interviews were
mostly carried out in the capital Bucharest (41 out of a total of 48) and
mostly in person (with three exceptions, where the interviews were
carried out by phone) and in Romanian (with two exceptions, where the
language of the interview was English). The sampling was purposeful,
aiming to obtain both “intensity” from information-rich cases and “varia-
tion” to enable the identification of patterns (Patton 2001, 108–109). In the
present analysis, we focused our attention on actors (either interviewed or
observed in public debates and events) following a field logic, paying
attention especially to those most prominent for the processes under scru-
tiny (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 243).
In the analysis below, we draw directly on a subset of 14 semi-
structured interviews and follow-up discussions with 13 activists from
eight NGOs that have cooperated on various secularist mobilizations
(including those we discuss here);8 three interviews and follow-up discus-
sions with three activists from as many counter-secularist NGOs;9 six
interviews with persons working in five religious organizations operating
at national level;10 one interview with an expert on religious education
from the Institute of Education Sciences (a direct subordinate to the
Ministry of Education); and one with a member of the National Council
Combating Discrimination. While we zoom in on just a few activists
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and organizations, our general argument is built on the data collected from
the subset of interviews indicated above, as well as on the observational
and textual data gathered during the research.
RELIGION IN ROMANIAN PUBLIC EDUCATION: A HISTORICAL
OVERVIEWAND OUTLINE OF THE STRATEGIC ACTION FIELD
Mobilization around religion’s presence in public education11 in Romania
since 1990 has involved an array of individuals and organizations, which
has stabilized in time with respect to its composition and strategic reper-
toire. What other authors have called a “strategic action field” gradually
arose, meaning an arena of conflict populated by actors aware of who
their friends and foes are, what is at stake, and what strategies are possible
and legitimate (see Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 3–5). Addressing state
officials, stoking debate in the public sphere through open letters, respond-
ing in the mass media to adversaries’ challenges, litigating in courts—
these strategies are all part and parcel of the conflicts reviewed in this
section. We illustrate contention dynamics by focusing on three main
themes: religious education classes in public schools, the presence of reli-
gious symbols on classroom walls, and the controversy over including sex
education in the school curriculum.
Religious Education
The presence or absence of religious education classes as well as their
content and who teaches them have been topics of contention in very
diverse times and places for groups interested in influencing the dynamics
of secularization (see, e.g., Jackson 1992 on the UK, Lisovskaya 2016 on
the Russian Federation). Romania in the past decades has been no excep-
tion, especially as educational standards concerning professionalism,
inclusion, and pluralism—such as those in OSCE’s Toledo Guiding
Principles on teaching about religion and beliefs12—have only gradually
made their way into the curriculum.
For over two decades, religious education classes (hereafter “RE” or
“Religion”) have been offered in Romanian public schools on a confes-
sional basis as “part of the core curriculum”, a phrase signaling that
schools are obliged to offer the course. This arrangement is open to all
of the 18 officially recognized denominations, but not to other religious
communities.13 Enrollment in RE has been made, for a couple of years
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already, based on parents’ request (“opt-in”). Pupils taking the course,
either within the school or, alternatively, in the communities, receive a
grade that contributes to their general average; those not taking it
receive no grade. Representatives of left out groups would prefer (as
pointed out to us)14 a class about the “history of religions” (“teaching
about religion” as recommended in the Toledo Principles) instead of the
catechetic education currently offered (“teaching religion”).
The subject matter “Religion” was introduced in public schools imme-
diately after the collapse of the communist regime through the efforts of
the majority Orthodox Church, which signed a formal protocol with the
Ministry of Education for this purpose in 1990. The move clearly signaled
an emergent dynamic of de-secularization, one that other authors have
characterized as “from above” (Karpov 2010, see also Lisovskaya and
Karpov 2010 on religious education in Russia). The 1990 protocol
made confessional religious instruction part of the public educational
offer and “framed subsequent debates on religious education in
Romania” (Stan and Turcescu 2007, 153).
While the Orthodox Church took the initiative and laid the foundation
stone for catechetic religious instruction in public schools, this arrange-
ment opened in time to other recognized religious denominations. Our
interviews with representatives of minority religious denominations indi-
cated that the formal opening (through the 1995 national Law on
Education) for religious minorities to teach “Religion” was accompanied
by practical problems, such as the difficulty of organizing on school pre-
mises study groups of at least seven pupils, or the evaluation of teaching
quality predominantly by Orthodox “Religion” teachers. In time, the
strategies of minority religious organizations without strong local concen-
trations of believers converged toward abandoning the offering of cate-
chetic education through the public school system.15 In contrast, the
Orthodox Church stabilized as the most active religious organization
defending the “Religion” class.
The Orthodox Church’s strong influence on religious education was met
by adamant criticism coming from the activists from the secularist camp of
the Romanian civil society (see, e.g., the contributions to the public debate
comprised in Enache 2007). In time, the latter managed to pressure state
authorities in charge of supervising the “Religion” curricula and textbooks
to pay more attention to sensitive issues such as inter-confessional rela-
tions and discrimination.16
As mentioned above, the array of organizations and individuals
involved in mobilizations around religion-and-education issues has
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stabilized in time with respect to its composition. On the secularist side,
two long-time human rights activists have arguably become the public
face of recent mobilizations on religious education. These are Remus
Cernea and Emil Moise, formerly both members of the Association
Solidarity for Freedom of Conscience (an NGO of which Moise is still
the president). The two activists have been prominently involved in the
mass media debates following the 2014 Constitutional Court decision
that changed the system of registration in the “Religion” class from an
“opt-out” procedure (pupils were enrolled by default, but they or their
legal guardians could ask for an exemption) to an “opt-in” procedure
(requests must first be filed before pupils are enrolled in the class).
While Cernea has been at the forefront of also other mobilization
themes (such as the legal protection of same-sex couples)17 Moise has
specialized in litigation concerning the place of religion in education.
Moise’s 2014 successful litigation at the Constitutional Court that
changed the enrollment procedure in the “Religion” class came after
several defeats in the legal field: in 2012, also at the Constitutional
Court (on the same issue of enrollment), and in 2008, at the High Court
of Cassation and Justice (on the presence of Orthodox religious symbols
in schools, to which we turn in the next sub-section).
The 2014 Constitutional Court ruling sparked intense debates in the
national public sphere between roughly November 2014 (when the deci-
sion was issued) and March 2015 (the legal deadline set for the filing
of requests in the new enrollment system). Televised debates provided a
good opportunity to observe the composition of the conflict arena, as
well as the position-takings and discursive strategies of the contending
individuals and organizations. In one such television show, aired by the
national-coverage channel Realitatea TV on February 26, 2015, Remus
Cernea represented the secularist camp (Emil Moise was interviewed by
telephone). Among the other guests (mostly defending the previous
“opt-out” system of enrollment in the “Religion” class) were a former
minister of Education, the president of the newly founded Association
“Parents for the Religion Class” (APOR, presented in more detail
below) and the administrative vicar of the Orthodox Church’s Patriarchate.
Interesting for our analysis was especially the exchange between Cernea
and the vicar. While the former defined the problem of default enrollment
as one of “rights” infringement (especially for students from minority reli-
gious communities), the latter responded promptly by drawing on formu-
lations from national legal texts. The vicar emphasized that he was
speaking in the debate “to a great extent as a jurist” and less as an
S88 Popa and Andreescu
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048318000068
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Max-Planck-Institutes, on 30 Mar 2020 at 07:52:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Orthodox priest. While he did not invoke the jurisprudence of the Court to
support his arguments (as he had done in other public interventions), the
vicar noted that the idea of “Europe” that guided secularist activists
seeking to push religion “to the private space” was mistaken, and that
European integration was not synonymous with the rejection of (national,
Orthodox) “tradition”.
We will present again below episodes in which jurists and juridical
expertise come to the fore in public debates in the arena of conflict that
we analyze. This dynamic is related to the presence of “rights” discourse
in public debates (stoked by secularist activists), which creates the wider
discursive context for referencing the Court and its case law.
As already pointed out, another guest in the above-mentioned television
show was the president of the countrywide association APOR, founded
under the spiritual guidance of the Orthodox Church’s Patriarch in the
aftermath of the 2014 Constitutional Court decision. The organization
was instrumental in mobilizing large numbers of parents to file requests
for their children to take the “Religion” class before the March 2015
enrollment deadline. Since then, it too became a stable organizational
actor of the counter-secularist frontline on religion-and-education issues
and, as we show later, it organized the participation of individuals with
juridical expertise in counter-secularist mobilizations beyond the religion-
and-education arena as well.
The Display of Religious Symbols in Public Schools
The same Emil Moise introduced above waged, primarily between 2006
and 2008, a battle against the unregulated display of Orthodox religious
icons on the walls of public schools. He did so in domestic courts as
well as at the National Council Combating Discrimination (hereafter
simply “anti-discrimination Council”). Because we return to Moise’s liti-
gation later below, we dwell in this section on the anti-discrimination
Council and on the most prominent protagonists of the counter-
mobilization that was sparked by the icons’ case.
As mentioned before, the process of EU accession was important for the
dynamics of (de-)secularization and the Court’s case law referencing in
Romania. The anti-discrimination Council, established in 2000 in connec-
tion with the adoption of EU anti-discrimination legislation, is an illustra-
tive example of how the EU accession process favored the secularist cause
through the building of institutions particularly mindful of European legal
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standards. Since its establishment, the anti-discrimination Council has
been headed by a College of Directors nominated by parliamentary
political parties but influenced by representatives of the human rights
(and secularist) sector of the Romanian civil society. The latter have pro-
posed members from within their ranks and have evaluated political
parties’ nominees. Enjoying an autonomy safeguarded through direct
European Commission monitoring (in the pre-accession period), the
anti-discrimination Council not only became an active user of the
Court’s case law in its public judgments, but also a “friend” of the secu-
larist cause—often in support of religious minorities and in opposition to
the majority Orthodox Church.18
In 2006, the Council, drawing also on the Court’s case law, answered
Moise’s complaint against the display of Orthodox icons in schools by
saying that, indeed, it was “contrary to the principle of the religious neu-
trality of the state”. The Council asked the Ministry of Education to issue
regulations to ensure that public schools display religious icons only
during “Religion” classes.19 The decision was contested in civil courts
by the Ministry of Education and by the Orthodox civil society activists
(which we present below), initially confirmed by an appellate court, but
eventually overturned by the High Court of Cassation and Justice.
Important in the economy of the conflict that ensued after the anti-
discrimination Council’s icons decision was not only the reaction of
the Orthodox Church (active across the themes we are concerned with
here), but also that of the Orthodox civil society organizations. While
an entire platform of protest ensued, one NGO remained particularly
active in the contention arena analyzed here. The Bucharest branch of
the pro-life Association “PRO VITA for the Born and the Unborn” (here-
after “ProVita-Bucharest”) intervened not only in the public debates, but
also in the legal battle against the decision on the removal of Orthodox
icons from schools. Because it is one of the stable actors in the field
under scrutiny here, we dwell for a moment on this organization before
moving on to the theme of sex education (on which ProVita-Bucharest
has also been very active).
ProVita-Bucharest was founded in 2005 and, while it gathers mainly
Orthodox activists, it is not subordinated to the Orthodox Church (differ-
ently from APOR). As one of this NGO’s representatives shared with us in
an interview, the organization does not prioritize litigation, but entered the
fight in the juridical field during the icons’ case in order to defend
the display of icons in public schools, viewed as “one of our rights”.
The NGO has since maintained an interest in legal battles and even
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submitted a third party intervention in the proceedings of the Lautsi v.
Italy (2011) case at the Court.20
Our ProVita-Bucharest interviewee (to whom we return again below)
was one of the most ECtHR-savvy interviewees working within a
counter-secularist NGO. This person was also an active contributor to
the pro-life forum Cultura Viet ̦ii (Eng. Culture of Life; www.culturavie
tii.ro), an online platform that presents (in Romanian) analyses of repro-
ductive rights and right-to-life issues, including on the relevance of the
Court’s decisions to the pro-life and pro-family agendas.21 The forum
also contains many contributions concerning the negative effects of sex
education, the third topic of contention we overview here.
Sex Education
The theme of mandatory sex education became a public issue much later
than religious education. It was brought to the attention of the Ministry of
Education by an array of activists and NGOs, most actively those focusing
on reproductive and LGBT rights, but also on state secularism (e.g., the
Secular Humanist Association from Romania—ASUR).22 Likely due to
the traumatic character of the Ceaus ̦escu regime’s pro-natalist policies
(see, e.g., Kligman 1998), for a while after 1990, some churches
avoided clear positions on the unpopular option of limiting reproductive
rights (see Stan and Turcescu 2005, 300, on the stance of the Orthodox
Church on abortion). NGOs in the pro-life movement, such as ProVita-
Bucharest, have been comparatively more emphatic in their counter-
mobilizations. Their campaigns against efforts by the Ministry of
Education to introduce an (initially optional) sex education curriculum
around the mid-2000s brought together conservative civil society organi-
zations and religious groups in concerted, forceful criticism. One NGO
particularly active on sex education and sexual mores in general is the
Alliance of Families from Romania (AFR).23 As an important player in
the field that interests us, and one stimulating attention to the Court
among counter-secularist activists, we briefly dwell on its story.
AFR was born in the aftermath of an unsuccessful mobilization to
change the definition of “marriage” in the Romanian Constitution so as
to explicitly denote “the union between a man and a woman” (rather
than “spouses”, as in the current form). In Romania, a referendum to
change the Constitution can be started through a “citizen initiative”,
which needs at least 500,000 signatures of support from at least half the
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country’s 41 counties and the capital Bucharest. The initiative started in
2006 failed to reach these goals, but the involved activists formed AFR
in its aftermath (ProVita-Bucharest is itself one of the founding
members of AFR, attesting to the close cooperation of the two NGOs).
In addition, links established around the time of the 2006 mobilization
to Alliance Defending Freedom, an international conservative NGO spe-
cialized in legal counseling (see Bob 2012, 100–1), are still maintained
by AFR. When the mobilization campaign was restarted in 2015 by the
same core group of activists (and this time met the technical criteria for
organizing a referendum), a heated debate that involved both national
and transnational activists with juridical expertise was sparked in the
national public sphere (a point to which we return below).
AFR, together with ProVita-Bucharest and the newly established APOR,
became recently the most prominent NGOs mobilizing in the arena of con-
flict around sex education. While they sometimes gather support signatures
from many other NGOs, these counter-secularist “front liners” are the
prime movers behind actions such as open letters to state authorities and
communiqués.24 In their strategy of gathering broader support for their
public interventions, they are not much different from their secularist counter-
parts,25 just as they are not different in leveraging publicly the judgments of
the Court. In the following two sections, we indicate how the practice of
Court referencing by secularist and counter-secularist actors has become
one element of an accepted repertoire of actions in both legal battle and
public debate. Grounded in the field-theoretical perspective, our account is
relational, in that it explains individual actors’ strategies in connection to a
wider set of “allies” and “adversaries”.
POST-COMMUNIST HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION AND THE
COURT’S RELEVANCE FOR SECULARIST ACTIVISTS
The secularist activist Emil Moise explained to us in an interview that he
had built his icons display litigation by drawing on ECHR provisions and
on the Court’s case law because the latter had been his envisaged final
destination. He conceded having felt “envious” when hearing about the
Chamber judgment in the Lautsi case, which supported the removal of
crucifixes from Italian classrooms, since he had hoped to be the first to
win such a case at the Court. The subsequent overturning of that decision
by the Grand Chamber did not demobilize Moise, who went ahead with
his own complaint at the Court, considering that the Romanian icons’
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case was different from the Italian crucifixes’ one. His application was
eventually unsuccessful.
When they go to court, activists such as Moise participate both in the
national legal field and in the “transnational legal field” of which the
Court (Madsen 2007; Koenig 2015) as well as other litigants, such as
the plaintiff Soile Lautsi, are a part. Below we indicate how it is possible
to understand Moise’s and other secularist activists’ enduring interest in
the Court’s jurisprudence in relation both to involvement in legal disputes
and to strategies of contention in the public sphere.
Analysts of Western aid to Eastern Europe have pointed out that, apart
from money, post-communist Eastern Europe was also the recipient of
models of organizing civil society (see, e.g., Sampson 1996). Observing
the field of human rights NGOs in Romania, some analysts have noted
the predominance of “discourses of professionalism and managerialism”
and of “an agenda of international lobbying, rather than one of social ser-
vices” (Stychin 2003, 133). We know from both personal experience
(especially that of the second author) as well as from our interviews
with activists from the secularist camp of the Romanian civil society
that this sector has received in time significant funding for strategic litiga-
tion from international donors (e.g., the Open Society Foundation). While
we do not imply that litigation funding was mainly responsible for activ-
ists’ attention to the Court, we do think it has made a difference in render-
ing the Court more effectively a mobilization option (Koopmans 1999).
Until the present time several NGOs joining secularist mobilizations
have also been successful in their adjacent agendas regarding the protec-
tion of vulnerable groups in post-communist Romania. NGOs such as the
Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania—Helsinki
Committee (APADOR-CH), the LGBT rights organization ACCEPT,
and the Centre for Legal Resources (CRJ) have all litigated and won
cases at the Court against the Romanian state. These cases revolved
around the protection of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities
(APADOR-CH), sexual minorities (ACCEPT), and institutionalized
persons (CRJ). This experience has surely played a role in making the
Court a relevant forum for human rights and secularist activists. Emil
Moise himself submitted a complaint to the Court with support from his
associates in the human rights camp. But we would suggest that the rele-
vance of the Court in the Romanian context gradually became more inde-
pendent of litigation at the Court per se.
At a conference with the topic “Balancing freedom of expression with
the principle of equality and non-discrimination” organized in Bucharest
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at the end of May 2015 by several human rights NGOs and attended by the
first author, the case law of the Court featured prominently in the discus-
sions. Emil Moise did not take part in this event, but some of his organi-
zational and individual associates were among the organizers and speakers.
The conference included representatives from the above-mentioned NGOs
APADOR-CH, ACCEPT, and CRJ, all experienced in litigation at the
Court. But while references to the Court’s case law were frequent, there
were also signs in the discussions that litigation was not necessarily the
main aim of the participants making these references. At one point, when
the representative of the anti-discrimination Council suggested to the activ-
ists present at the conference to litigate in Strasbourg in order to improve the
Council’s decisions if the domestic courts would fail to do so, one activist
from CRJ retorted vehemently that litigation at the Court was “expensive”
and that things should be resolved by the national institutions.
Litigating in Strasbourg has lost in both feasibility and importance for
the human rights activists after Romania’s accession to the EU. Several
activists pointed to us that, after this point in time, strategic litigation
funds were more difficult to find (e.g., the Open Society Foundation is
still an important donor, though funding has been reduced). In addition,
activists can now also turn to the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) for cases solvable through appeal to EU legislation. This
was the path recently chosen by LGBT rights activists, who reached the
CJEU with the case of a same-sex couple married in Belgium, in which
the main complaint revolved around the Romanian authorities’ refusal
to grant one spouse a residence permit qua member of the other
spouse’s family (Coman case C-673/16, currently pending before the
CJEU).26 Our interviews show, however, that human rights/secularist
activists still maintain an active interest in the Court.27 Even in the
absence of a clear aim to litigate in Strasbourg, references to the Court
are very much relevant for legal battles in Romanian courts or for argu-
ments in public debates.
To refer back to Fraser’s (1990) point, knowledge of the Court’s case law
will likely continue to play a role as a marker of activist “distinction” in the
Romanian public sphere. For instance, in one televised debate, Emil Moise
himself underscored the importance of his expertise and the strength of his
argumentation by pointing to the energy devoted to the study of “the
European Court’s case law” (in addition to documents from other supra-
national institutions).28 As we show in the next section, counter-secularist
activists today act in similar fashion, after having learned from their secular-
ist adversaries and from their counter-secularist allies.
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COUNTER-SECULARIST POSITION-TAKINGS DRAWING ON
THE COURT AND ITS CASE LAW
The process of integration into wider European structures after the fall of
communism has provided human rights and secularist activists both with
political leverage (illustrated, for instance, by the activity of the anti-
discrimination Council) and with a symbolic advantage. The fact that
“European” institutions have been and still are trusted by the majority
of Romanian citizens much more than state institutions only made it
easier, in our view, for these activists to import into public debates argu-
ments based on European legal instruments. Some conservative public
intellectuals have criticized the deployment of this discursive strategy
for secularist goals as “fraud” and accused secularist activists of “black-
mailing” Romanian “corrupt and opportunistic (state) institutions with
‘human rights’ and ‘European legislation’”.29 Such criticisms may reso-
nate with many in the counter-secularist camp of Romanian civil
society. Still, in time an increasingly visible segment of the latter has
come to accept the “human rights” idiom. By engaging in competition
for symbolic advantage within the same “comprehensive public” as their
opponents (Fraser 1990, 66–68), these counter-secularist activists have
gradually come to embrace the task of “translating” (Habermas 2008) reli-
gion-based claims into the frame of legal argumentation. By strengthening
the salience of juridical and “rights” pronouncements in the conflict arena
we analyze here, these activists have contributed themselves to discourse
secularization in the Romanian public sphere.
As social movement scholars have pointed out, when activists on
opposing sides participate in the same contention arenas, they are likely
to adapt to one another’s strategies and repertoires of action (Meyer and
Staggenborg 1996, 1649–1650). Such dynamics came up in our inter-
views with representatives of ProVita-Bucharest and AFR. For instance,
our interviewee from ProVita-Bucharest told us that he became interested
in the Court when the secularists, pressing for the removal of icons from
schools, threatened to take the case to the Court in Strasbourg if domestic
courts would overturn the anti-discrimination Council’s decision. As our
interviewee intimated,
They [the secularists] kept saying that they would take the case to the
ECtHR. […]For us, [the ECtHR] was relevant, of course, because we
thought that if we lose here, we would go to the ECtHR […] with a
request for intervention.
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A similar dynamic was reflected in the account of our AFR interviewee,
who confided that his interest in the case law of the Court was aroused
by its frequent referencing in the amici curiae letters submitted to the
Constitutional Court by the LGBT rights activists who had opposed the
2006 initiative to change the Constitution.
While the accounts of these two actors do not enable us to assert with
certainty that 2006 represented a turning point in stimulating interest in the
Court among counter-secularist activists in Romania, additional evidence
supports our observation that the “rights” discourse, legal argumentation,
and Court referencing gained serious momentum in this camp, especially
after the middle of the previous decade.
After the above-mentioned episodes, both our interviewees developed
stable connections to jurists from the European Centre for Law and
Justice (ECLJ) and Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF), two counter-
secularist NGOs active at European and international level. These interna-
tional conservative organizations have increasingly been involved in legal
proceedings important for Romanian religion-related mobilizations (most
recently, on the constitutional change of the definition of “marriage”
and on the latest Coman case mentioned above). Moreover, Romanian-
speaking jurists from these two international NGOs have come to partic-
ipate in debates in the national public sphere.30 Even more notably, an
increasing variety of counter-secularist actors have come to make use of
human rights documents and to reference the Court as visible, at
present, in televised debates.
For example, on June 3, 2017, the national television channel TVR 1
aired a show titled “Appeal to Morals” (Rom. “Apel la morala˘”) on the
mobilization to change the Constitution. A lawyer and spokesperson
from APOR, the NGO bringing together “parents for the ‘Religion’
class”, which joined the 2015 citizen mobilization platform targeting the
constitutional definition of “marriage”, defended the position of her mobi-
lization camp by, among others, referencing the Strasbourg Court and its
case law. In the debate, this activist responded to an LGBT rights sup-
porter in the following way:
I will respond to you, and I respond with reference to the European Court of
Human Rights […] [which] in a constant jurisprudence—constant, from…
the oldest I can remember [now] is the case Karner versus Austria, but there
are also older [cases], until the last [ judgement] of the Court of Justice of
the European Union from November 24th, 2016—all the European jurispru-
dence has a red thread, both of the European Court of Human Rights, and of
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the Court of Justice [of the European Union], and it says the same thing: to
define marriage is the exclusive attribute of the member state.
Such a position-taking is not exceptional at present in the counter-
secularist camp, where not only jurists but also actors with other qualifi-
cations (e.g., an actress, a journalist)31 have entered public debates armed
with legal pronouncements, including from human rights treaties and the
case law of the Court.
The references to the Court’s case law made in public debates are some-
times “ornamental”, meaning that the doctrinal content of the referenced
decision does not necessarily support the particular argument being
made. The Karner reference above is perhaps a good example.
From the perspective of LGBT rights supporters, counter-secularist
activists “misuse” the jurisprudence of the Court. As some emphasized
to us,32 the counter-secularists ignore the most recent developments of
the jurisprudence and cite outdated cases, preferentially select Court
pronouncements and take them out of context, or even distort the
content of the pronouncements. Of course, most of these imputed prac-
tices pertain to the array of argumentative strategies commonly encoun-
tered among lawyers. In any case, such observations support Fraser’s
(1990) point about discursive practices in the public sphere being com-
petitive practices that follow the logic of the accumulation of symbolic
capital (“distinction”), and deviating from the Habermasian communica-
tive ideal.
From a different viewpoint, one may also read the inter-linked processes
presented in this section as augmenting the secularization of discourse in
the public sphere, as policy claims grounded in religious belief become
“translated” (Habermas 2008) through the use of the Court’s case law
(and other international legal documents) into claims formulated in jurid-
ical language.
CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, we return to the main question raised by the contributions in
this symposium, namely, to what extent is it possible to discern a
“shadow” of the European Court over the social mobilizations concerning
religion’s place in education in present-day Romania. As we have shown,
the Court has been perceived as a component of the relevant opportunity
structure and has been approached by Romanian secularist activists as a
forum for the pursuit of their agendas. In addition, the jurisprudence of
Religion and Education in Romania S97
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048318000068
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Max-Planck-Institutes, on 30 Mar 2020 at 07:52:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
the Court features in public debates, suggesting that the “indirect” or “radi-
ating” effects of the Court’s case law should be also sought beyond the
juridical field (compare, e.g., Koenig 2015).
The use of Court references in public debates in present-day Romania can
be interpreted as illustrative of the importance of this “species of capital”
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) within the tension-fraught national public
sphere (Fraser 1990). Such practices are likely to reinforce the perception
of the Court as a component of the “political opportunity structure”
(Koopmans 1999) relevant for (counter-)secularist mobilizations in
Romania. Last but not least, this logic of discursive conflict within the
public sphere presses activists to “translate” (Habermas 2008) claims
grounded in religious belief into the secular language of legal argumentation.
As our examples indicated, the invocation of the Court in public debates
follows from a variable combination of developments in its reasoning and
the usefulness of its (recent or older) pronouncements for activists’
agendas. The clash of arguments at the present time is generated within dis-
cursive dynamics growing out of both national and transnational activism.
These findings support the idea of “de-centering” (Galanter 1983) the anal-
ysis of the Court’s relevance for religion-related mobilizations away from the
doctrinal content of the decisions and closer to the actual uses that (counter-)
secularist activists make of them, both within and beyond the legal arena.
Supplementary Material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/
10.1017/S1755048318000068.
NOTES
1. This analysis is based on data generated in the Grassrootsmobilise research program funded by
the European Research Council (GA No. 338463). The authors thank their colleagues from the
Grassrootsmobilise team, Nicholas Tampio, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their useful com-
ments on the manuscript. The first author additionally acknowledges the support granted by the Centre
for Citizenship, Social Pluralism and Religious Diversity at the University of Potsdam through a vis-
iting research fellowship during which parts of this analysis have been developed.
2. See this symposium’s introductory text for a broad definition of the notion of ‘mobilization’ as
employed here.
3. For instance, in 2016, Romania ranked fifth out of 47 member states in the Council of Europe in
the number of pending cases, and had already been found in violation of at least one article of the
European Convention on Human Rights in over 1,100 cases since its ratification of the treaty in
1994. See the various statistical reports on the ECtHR website, particularly http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Facts_Figures_2016_ENG.pdf and http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_
1959_2016_ENG.pdf, accessed January 5, 2018.
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4. No less than 89% of respondents in a national survey carried out in 2015 declared they heard
about the Court, and 71% stated they trusted it highly. Survey report available at http://www.dreptur
icivile.ro/wp-content/uploads/docs/APADOR_Studiu_sociologic_Drepturile_omului.pdf, accessed
June 30, 2017.
5. Fifty-seven percent of Romanians trust the EU compared with a 42% average in the EU-28,
according to the 2017 Eurobarometer (available at http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopin
ion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/79118, accessed November 22, 2017).
6. The Appendix is available online at http://grassrootsmobilise.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/
Religion-and-Education-in-Romania_Appendix.pdf and at https://perma.cc/8FP8-8LH3.
7. Mandatory courses on ECtHR jurisprudence are absent from law schools’ undergraduate curric-
ula. This situation was indicated as a shortcoming by several interviewees involved in human rights
litigation (interviews 1 and 6 in Table 1 in the Appendix).
8. Interviews 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 37, 46.
9. Interviews 22, 27, 29.
10. Interviews 5, 12, 13, 16, 19, 38.
11. The private education sector is underdeveloped in Romania, except for kindergartens and uni-
versities. It consists mainly of several dozen upper secondary and high schools, falling into two major
classes: competitive schools targeting the children of the well-to-do; and (non-theological) confes-
sional schools and high schools.
12. Document available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/29154?download=true, accessed December
16, 2017.
13. In Romania, Law 489/2006 on Religious Freedom and Religious Denominations distinguishes
between three types of religious communities, which benefit from different levels of state recognition
and support: ‘religious denominations’ (Rom. culte), ‘religious associations’ (Rom. asociații reli-
gioase), and ‘religious groups’ (Rom. grupuri religioase) (see Andreescu 2008, Popa and
Andreescu 2017 for analyses of these legal categories’ implications for religious freedom).
14. Interview 38.
15. The Greek Catholic Church may represent one of the partial exceptions to this trend: the only
RE case which reached the ECtHR from Romania (Jula v. Romania, pending) arose from this religious
community. The case is centered on the complaint that the law discriminates against minority Greek
Catholics by setting a high numerical threshold (seven pupils) for the organization of a study group.
16. Interview 2.
17. See, for instance, Cernea’s comment on the Court’s “historical decision” regarding the legal
protection of same-sex couples in Oliari and Others v. Italy (2015), and on the Court’s case law
more generally as “mandatory for all member states of the Council of Europe, thus also for
Romania” (available (in Romanian) at http://voxpublica.realitatea.net/politica-societate/decizie-istor-
ica-a-curtii-europene-a-drepturilor-omului-care-obliga-statul-sa-recunoasca-parteneriatul-civil-sisau-
casatoria-per
soanelor-de-acelasi-sex-113476.html, accessed December 7, 2017).
18. See, e.g., the anti-discrimination Council’s Decision no. 279/2007 judging a textbook for the
Orthodox ‘Religion’ class to infringe anti-discrimination legislation because it presented several
minority religions in deprecatory terms.
19. Decision no. 323/2006, on file with the authors.
20. See the intervention of ProVita-Bucharest at the Court after the Chamber decision asking for the
case to be referred to the Grand Chamber, available (in Romanian) at http://provitabucuresti.ro/activi
tati/just/298-lautsi-vs-italia-cedo, accessed December 2, 2017. The Lautsi case became notorious in the
Romanian public sphere, coming as it did immediately after the heated icons debate. The Grand
Chamber decision was met with approval by the Orthodox Church and Orthodox civil society orga-
nizations. In contrast, it may have demobilized some secularist actors. Our interviewee from the
anti-discrimination Council considered the decision to have been no less than “a slap in the face”
for his institution.
21. See, for instance, the analysis of Gregor Puppinck (the Director General of the European Center
for Law and Justice) concerning “abortion in European law” (including the Court’s case law) available
(in Romanian translation) at http://www.culturavietii.ro/2016/06/20/avortul-legislatia-europeana-nou-
studiu/, accessed December 7, 2017.
22. See, for instance, the open letter from June 12, 2015 submitted by ASUR and other NGOs to
the Ministry of Education asking for the laying off of a ministerial counselor, a founding member of
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the parents’ association APOR, for an alleged religious bias against mandatory sex education (available
(in Romanian) at http://www.asur.ro/solicitare-catre-ministerul-educatiei-nationale/, accessed
December 3, 2017).
23. See, for instance, the open letter from June 11, 2015 asking the Minister of Education and the




24. See, e.g., the open letter cited above (n. 23).
25. See, e.g., the open letter cited above (n. 22).
26. For a description of the case, see http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.de/2017/03/awaiting-ecj-judg
ment-in-coman-towards.html, accessed December 7, 2017.
27. Especially interviews 1, 4, 6, 8, 14, 20, 24, 25, 46.
28. In the television show “Jocuri de putere” (Eng. “Power Games”) aired by Realitatea TV on
March 5, 2015, Moise responded in this way to the remarks of a constitutional law professor close
to the counter-secularist camp, who had just questioned Moise’s juridical expertise. A philosophy
teacher, Moise gathered juridical expertise directly through litigation in his own name and that of
his association, even before graduating a study program in law.
29. See the public intervention of philosopher Horia Roman Patapievici in response to the anti-
discrimination Council’s decision asking for the removal of Orthodox icons from public schools,
available (in Romanian) at http://inliniedreapta.net/dereferinta/horia-roman-patapievici-legitimarea-
anticrestinismului-prin-redefinirea-centrului/, accessed December 8, 2017.
30. See, for instance, the comments on the Court’s case law by ECLJ jurist Andreea Popescu, on
the conservative forum În Linie Dreapta˘ (Eng. The Right Line, http://inliniedreapta.net); and the con-
tributions of ADF legal counsel Adina Portaru to the pro-life blog Cultura Vieții (Eng. Culture of Life,
www.culturavietii.ro).
31. See the examples discussed by the first author in an intermediary research contribution pub-
lished online at http://grassrootsmobilise.eu/7-romania-picking-up-the-white-glove-juridical-argu
ments-in-contentious-discourse-concerning-the-legal-recognition-of-same-sex-couples-in-romania/,
accessed December 1, 2017.
32. Interviews 25, 46.
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